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Managing Investment Risks of Institutional Private Equity Investors 
 





Since private equity investments are not publicly traded, a key issue in measuring 
investment risks of institutional private equity investors arises from a careful measurement of 
investment returns in the first place. Prices of private equity investments are typically 
observed at low frequency and are determined by transactions under low liquidity. This 
contribution highlights useful approaches to the problem of return measurement under 
conditions of illiquidity. Then, specific risk management issues, including asset allocation 
issues, are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
Private equity has become an increasingly important alternative asset class for 
institutional investors as it may offer return as well as diversification benefits relative to 
traditional stock and bond market investments. In fact, the market for private equity 
investments has grown dramatically over the 1998 to 2000 period. However, the 
economic downturn during 2001 to 2003 had a strong negative impact on the funds 
raised by the private equity industry. Nevertheless, it is common wisdom that private 
equity will again become an important source of corporate financing and, thereby, an 
important driver in economic prosperity. 
From an economic point of view, one of the most important advantages of private 
equity compared to public equity is to overcome the free-rider problem in corporate 
control. While dispersed ownership as the typical ownership structure in public equity 
markets does not generate sufficient incentives to undertake costly control activities, 
private equity markets typically go along with concentrated ownership in portfolio 
companies. This is because the private equity investor normally holds a large part of 
equity in his portfolio company. For that reason he exercises a continuous monitoring 
activity. The private equity investor is typically by itself a fund where a given number 
of private or institutional investors, called limited partners, have paid in their capital. 
The fund is run by a management team called general partner. Of course, a conflict of 
interests between the general and the limited partners could arise. Normally, however, 
this problem will be avoided as the number of limited partners is not too high and the 
general partner has either invested his own money in the fund or is paid according to 
some purposeful incentive scheme. Whether these problems may become more serious 
in the case of a fund of funds construction, may be left open here. In such cases the 
outside investor has only a contractual relationship with the management team of the 
fund of funds; the allocation of capital to different private equity funds is made by the 
management team. 
From an investors point of view it is important to note that several empirical results, 
which are available particularly for venture capital as a special segment of private 
equity focused on financing high risk start-up firms, indicate that this kind of alternative  
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investment may indeed offer desirable risk-return and particularly diversification 
characteristics.1 
Despite these potential benefits it is important to point out that the lack of an organised 
secondary market for alternative investments comes along with low liquidity or even 
illiquidity in the transfer of alternative asset ownership. Hence, a major drawback of the 
private equity asset class is its liquidity risk. The latter can manifest itself with the 
impossibility to transact at a given point in time and/or with the occurrence of 
substantial transaction cost.2 
There are two major consequences of the lack of an organised secondary market. First, 
liquidity –jointly with investment risk and return– will play a major role in a fund 
manager’s decision to include private equity in her managed fund of assets. Second, we 
argue here that liquidity has an additional indirect impact on the decision to invest in 
that it has an important impact on the measurement of returns of relatively illiquid 
assets. As risk is statistically derived from return observations, liquidity will also play a 
key role in an accurate measurement of private equity investment risk. 
In the following section we discuss useful approaches to the problem of liquidity related 
return and risk measurement. Hereby, we present two important methods how return 
characteristics can be measured in the context of illiquid markets. The first method 
presented in Section 2.1 relies on reported asset values, while the second method 
presented in Section 2.2 is based on observable, although infrequent cash flows. Given 
that private equity returns were determined, Section 3 then discusses the consequences 
for risk management as well as asset allocation issues. Obviously, most of the risk 
management and asset allocation methods that apply to public equity will also apply to 
private equity. However, there are some issues, especially related to the problem of 
illiquidity and measurement biases, which are specific in risk management and asset 
allocation of private equity investments. These issues are discussed in Sections 3.1 and 
3.2. Section 4 contains a brief conclusion and gives a topic outlook. 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Schilit (1993), Cochrane (2001), Chen et al. (2002), Emery (2003), and the literature given 
therein. For an overview of venture capital see also for example Gompers and Lerner (1999). 
2 Such transaction costs are for example given by high market impact costs, the cost of searching 
potential buyers and sellers as well as potential agency costs related to changes in the ownership 
structure given a desired transfer of assets.  
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2.  Measuring Private Equity Returns and Risk 
It has already been mentioned that a private equity investment can be undertaken 
directly or indirectly via a so called private equity fund. Therefore, risk-/return 
characteristics of private equity investments can basically be defined from two different 
perspectives. Either one is interested in assessing the return distribution of an 
investment in a single company seeking for equity financing or in assessing the return 
distribution of an investment in a private equity fund. As far as risk management issues 
are concerned the first perspective is especially relevant from the viewpoint of a general 
partner, as he is supposed to make congruent decisions with respect to the allocation of 
capital provided by limited partners to portfolio firms. The second perspective is 
relevant for a private or institutional investor considering to act as a limited partner, i.e. 
to invest money in a private equity fund.3 Hence, when talking about return distributions 
one should make clear as to what kind of return processes he is referring to: returns 
generated at the level of a single portfolio firm, labelled as transaction level, or returns 
generated at the level of a private equity fund, labelled as the fund level. 
As this article deals with risk management issues of institutional investors we are 
focussing on return distribution at the fund level. However, much of the methodological 
issues raised here could safely be applied to return distributions at the transaction level 
as well. Hence, these different perspectives are not that important for what follows here. 
From an economic point of view, the most important characteristic of private equity 
investments are missing or highly imperfect secondary markets. As a consequence, for 
any single fund investment there are only a few points in time for which transaction 
prices can be observed: when limited partners pay in their capital and when the 
investment is liquidated. Usually, such transactions do not happen very frequently. Over 
a fund’s lifetime, normally 5 to 10 years, one would observe not more than a handful of 
cash flow transactions between the fund and its limited partners.  Moreover, even if cash 
flows would arise more frequently, the lack of reliable information with respect to the 
market value of a particular private equity fund will not be offset. As a consequence, no 
intermediate series of historical returns is available. Therefore, realized returns of 
private equity investments can only be observed by looking at the cash flow stream 
generated over a fund’s lifetime. However, one should be careful in comparing cash 
flow based internal rates of return (IRRs) with return figures derived from the market 
                                                 
3 Obviously, this perspective is also relevant for a fund of funds manager.  
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value observation of a public equity investment. As an alternative, one could calculate 
stock based private equity returns on the basis of reported asset values, such as net asset 
values (NAV). However, these values do not represent market transactions and may be 
subject to rigidity due to smoothing activities undertaken by the fund management 
and/or subject to observational noise. 
The problem of assessing return distributions of assets traded on markets subject to 
liquidity constraints has been first analyzed in the context of the asynchronous trading 
literature in finance. Scholes and Williams (1977), Roll (1981) and Cohen et al. (1983) 
consider the estimation of asset betas of relatively illiquid small capitalisation stocks. A 
more elaborated version of this approach has been presented by Lo and MacKinlay 
(1990). As they rely on the assumption that market prices of assets can be observed at 
least at some points in time, an extension of this approach to the issues in question here 
is not possible.4 More recently and more appropriate, Getmansky et al. (2003) derive a 
related econometric time series model which considers return smoothing as a result of 
illiquidity in investment portfolios. This will be considered in more detail here. 
Peng (2001) proposes an extension to repeat sales regression which was used in the real 
estate finance literature. The method is based on estimating time series returns of a 
portfolio of infrequently traded assets based on a cross-section of observed transaction 
prices for a subset of assets. 
Other approaches to illiquidity include Longstaff (1995) who uses option-pricing theory 
in order to assess the maximum value of the ability to trade immediately in a liquid 
market. The model derives an upper bound for the value by assuming a trader with 
perfect foresight. In case the trader wants to sell, in a perfectly liquid market he may 
realize the maximum asset value governing at a given time period and, hence, realize 
the value of a lookback option. This option value then can be considered as an upper 
bound for the value of marketability to an investor with imperfect foresight. 
While the Longstaff (1995) approach may be useful to derive upper bounds on 
discounts for private equity asset values, it does not relate to asset price dynamics and 
the measurement of returns and risk. As we do not assume to have a representative 
cross-section of assets, the approach by Peng (2001) seems to have too high data 
requirements. In the following we will therefore first focus on the approach of 
                                                 
4 For a more detailed description of this approach cf. Campbell et al. (1997, p. 84 n.).  
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Getmansky et al. (2003). Thereafter, we will discuss the implications of measuring cash 
flow based returns instead of asset value based returns. 
2.1  Asset Value based Returns 
In an ideal economy with frictionless and informational efficient markets, i.e. when 
transaction costs can be neglected and all information is immediately incorporated into 
market prices, classical finance models apply. In these models asset prices Pt fluctuate 
randomly and returns Rt = Pt/Pt–1 − 1 are hence independent.5 
In discrete time, i.e. for t = 1, ..., T, such ideal conditions can be formalised by assuming 
that the return Rt is independently and identically distributed (iid) with a common 
distribution function F. For our purposes we can think of Rt as the true period-t asset 
return of an investment in a private equity fund. 
Under illiquidity, the true period-t asset return Rt will –by definition– be unobservable. 
Think, for instance, at a private equity investment in a single company. In this case, the 
value of this investment can be observed on the vintage date, i.e. the day the capital is 
injected into the company, and on the exit date, i.e. the day the private equity investor 
sells its stocks on the market. Frequently there are intermediate transactions, for 
instance, when there are additional financing rounds or when the private equity 
investors makes a partial sell-off from his stake. Hence, with respect to the value of a 
single portfolio company investment we have a handful of points in time where asset 
prices can be observed on the basis of transaction related prices. If, however, we think 
of a private equity investment, even this kind of restricted revelation of market values 
may break down. As the fund is typically invested in more than one company, cash 
flows between the fund and its investors can be regarded as pooled cash flows between 
the fund and all its portfolio companies. In this case the fund’s asset values can be 
observed on the vintage date and on the liquidation date. However, as long as there are 
some intermediate cash flows between the fund and the investors putting these two 
values into relation does not reveal anything about the true return generated for the 
investors. 
One way out of this problem is to check as to what extend intermediate true returns can 
be inferred from accounting based asset values. Specifically, private equity funds 
                                                 
5 In some models it is assumed that not discrete but continuous returns are independent. For our purposes 
here, this difference is of minor importance. Actually, we assume discrete returns to be independent.  
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regularly disclose NAV on a semi-annual or even quarterly basis. These values are 
calculated along valuation guidelines developed in some kind of self-regulation context 
and are supposed to reflect the fair value of the whole investment portfolio. Moreover, 
under some circumstances the fair value should be derived within a marking-to-market 
framework. Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that NAV would only occasionally reflect 
the true market price, i.e. the price at which a fund’s assets could be sold in an open 
market transaction. This may either be due to unavoidable valuation errors made by the 
general partner or due to a strategic disclosure policy followed by the latter. 
However, it can be shown that at least under some circumstances it may be possible to 
derive true returns from observed NAV. Lets assume that we can, in fact, observe some 
intermediate proxy return Qt. This, of course, implies a perceivable loss of information 
about the underlying distribution F of the true returns Rt. In particular, we loose 
information about the risk inherent in these returns. In order to gather at least some 
information on F one has to assume some model based relationship between the true 
returns Rt and the observed returns Qt. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the given situation of a true price process Pt and two intermediate 
price estimates that deviate from the true prices. The deviating price estimates imply 
errors in the observed intermediate returns Qt. The figure is set up as a simplifying 
situation for a private equity investment with initial investment P0 at time zero and final 






Fig. 2.1. True price process Pt and deviating price estimates at time t and t’ each being reported 
before final liquidation time T. 
t P ˆ
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With respect to modelling the relationship between true returns Rt and the observed 
returns Qt’s a huge number of different specifications may be conceivable. However, 
based on findings in the literature we believe that the following two different 
specifications for the time being are the most important ones. 
2.1.2  Smoothed Proxy Observations 
Getmansky et al. (2003) assume that due to smoothing we observe period-t returns 
which are weighted sums of the true period-t return and k lagged past true returns. This 
means that, for i = 0, 1, ..., k, we have a process of the form 
 
where the weights 0 ≤ wi ≤ 1 satisfy the restriction w0 + w1 + ... + wk = 1. Together with 
the condition that true returns are iid this makes sure that expected returns calculated on 
the basis of observed returns are an unbiased estimation for expected true returns. 
However, as a result of the smoothing process, period-t variance will be underestimated. 
In fact, according to our assumptions the following relationship will hold: 
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Unless the condition wi
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l  ∀i applies, contemporaneous correlation between 
observed returns of two different private equity funds is smaller than the correlation of 
true returns of the same funds. Hence, estimating multivariate distributions on the basis 
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of observed returns subject to smoothing leads to underestimation of true return 
variance as well as true return correlation. Finally, as far as the correlation between 
observed returns and the return on the market portfolio is concerned, a bias could arise 
as well. Assume that Rt
M is the true, observable market portfolio return, for instance 
measured by an unbiased proxy like a market index. In this case we are interested in 
estimating the correlation coefficient between the true private equity return and the 










1/2. Again, given that we can only observe the smoothed proxy Qt, 
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To sum up, estimating private equity investment’s return distributions on the basis of 
accounting-based appraisal values, like net asset values disclosed by general partners, is 
subject to serious estimation biases. In fact, Emery (2003) presented evidence in favour 
of so called stale pricing. In the context of a simple regression analysis he showed that 
NAV based private equity returns adjust with a lag movement to public returns. Of 
course, on the basis of the analysis presented here it will be possible to correct for this 
estimation bias, at least theoretically. Getmansky et al. (2003) show how such a 
corrected estimation can be achieved by using the returns on a large sample of hedge 
funds. However, it should be noted that this correction method rests on the assumption 
that the smoothing process does not affect the expected sample return and that the 
process, as described by the parameters 0 ≤ wi ≤ 1, is stable over time. As smoothing 
may not only be due to informational problems associated with illiquidity but also to 
deliberate actions set by general partners, it is still an open question whether the 
methods discussed here will really be sufficient for avoiding perceivable estimation 
biases. This is much more than a statistical issue, because even small estimation errors  
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can have a large impact on asset allocation decisions. This issue will be treated in 
Section 3. 
2.1.3 Noisy  Smoothed  Proxy Observations 
In addition to the problems already mentioned in the preceding section, we would like 
to emphasize that the approach presented by Getmansky et al. (2003) also rules out 
observational noise. In other words, it may well be that even if the general manager of a 
private equity fund would really like to disclose the true NAV he is unable to do so 
because of the inability to infer the market value from available information. More 
formally spoken, the above model assumes that all observations Qt are purely based on 
true returns and, hence, that accounting-based valuation exactly matches market 
valuation apart from its slower reaction to news. 
In evaluating return distributions of private equity investments, alternative model 
specifications could be useful. Such models can allow for transitory deviations between 
the unobserved market value-based and the accounting-based returns. One possible 
specification would be to add observational noise to the above introduced equation for 
Qt. In order to make our point in the simplest possible way, we first rule out the 
existence of any smoothing at all. In that case Qt can be modelled as a noisy observation 
of the true return 
 
where both returns are assumed to have identical unconditional expectations. The noise 
terms Xt have zero unconditional expectation, E(Xt) = 0, are uncorrelated with the true 
returns,  Corr(Rt;  Xt) = 0, and may exhibit linear dependence of the first-order 
autoregressive type 
 
with |ρ| < 1 and iid innovations ηt ∼ N(0, σ
2). It then obviously follows 
 
 
Hence, although there is a possible effect of persistency in the observations Qt, which is 
modelled through the dependent noise Xt, true return variance in this case is over-, not 
underestimated. It can easily be seen that one cannot rule out this result even under the 
assumption of smoothed returns. Even though an estimation of this model with 
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observational noise may be performed within a state-space setting, this is potential bad 
news as to what our ability of identifying the true return distribution of a private equity 
investment is concerned. 
To sum up, specifying a reliable model for Qt might be a rather tricky task. And for the 
time being we cannot even be sure whether observed NAV based returns over- or 
underestimate true return variance.6 
2.2  Cash Flow based Returns 
Instead of relying on smoothed and/or noisy asset value based returns one can try to 
infer true investment returns from observable cash flow transactions between private 
equity funds and their limited partners. Under this perspective the return on a private 
equity investment could be measured by its internal rate of return (IRR). However, one 
should be careful in putting the IRR simply in relation to asset value based returns 
observed on the public equity market. This is because the IRR is a dollar-weighted 
return, while asset value based returns are time-weighted returns. In other words, while 
an asset value based return over a period of length T is simply the geometric mean of 
the single period realizations 1+Rt, the IRR is a value-weighted average of these returns. 
Unless an investment consists of two cash flows only, a single initial investment and a 
single final repayment, the IRR would be different from the geometric mean of single 
period realizations 1+Rt. The following simple example gives a flavour of the 
measurement relevance of this difference. Assume a private equity investment where –
for whatever reasons– true market values are known and disclosed as NAV. The lifetime 
of the fund is assumed to be three years. Assume moreover that general partners define 
payouts to limited partners in a way that the cash flows are generated according to Table 
2.2. 
 
T  0 1 2 3 
Rt   10%  20%  5% 
NAVt   110  32  33.6 
CFt  –100 0  100  33.6 
Tab. 2.2. Unobservable true returns, true NAV as well as cash flows of a private equity fund 
investment. 
                                                 
6 As a corollary it should be noted that the model with observational noise generates an unbiased 
estimation for the true return correlation of two different private equity funds as well as for the return 
correlation of a private and public equity investment as long as the additional assumption Cov(Xt
n; Xt
l) = 
0 holds.  
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Based on NAV, the average true return over the fund’s lifetime is 11.5%,7 while the IRR 
is 13.8%. Hence, observed IRR cannot be taken as an unbiased measure for the true 
expected return Rt .8 
According to this simple insight an inference from observed IRRs on unobserved Rt is 
not obtained straightforwardly. However, an inference may be possible on the basis of 
additional assumptions. For instance, the following solution was proposed by Rouvinez 
(2003). In order to transform a multi-period cash flow stream into a two period wealth 
comparison he defines a start date T0 and a terminal date T’. Any single private equity 
investment fund is raised a some point t ≥ T0 and liquidated at some point T ≤ T’, with t 
< T. Now, all the cash paid into the fund is discounted back to period T0 , while all the 
cash paid out to investors is compounded up to period T’. For this intertemporal 
transformation the risk free interest rate r is used; it is assumed to be constant. Hence, 
initial and terminal wealth corresponding to cash flows generated by a single private 
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in resp. , CFi
out is the cash paid into or paid out of the fund in period i. The 
ratio of terminal wealth to initial wealth, basically, gives an information into how many 
Euros a one Euro investment at time T0 will be transformed up to time T’, given that the 
investment is exposed to private equity risk for a total period of T–t. Now, the expected 
true return during the exposure to private equity risk, i.e. E[WT/Wt], can be expressed as 
a function of time length of this exposure, i.e. T–t, and the expected overall rate of 
return, i.e. E[WT’/WT0]. In fact, it can be shown that the following relationship must 
hold: 
 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that the drop in the NAV from period 1 to period 2 is due to the payout of 100. 
Hence, the return has to be measured on the basis of a payout corrected NAV. 
8 For the IRR to be an unbiased estimator, Rt must be iid and only two cash flows are allowed to occur 
over the lifetime of the fund.  
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Using real life cash flow figures this expectation and variance can easily be calculated. 
In fact, E[WT/Wt] can be regarded as the expectation of a pooled rate of return of the 
whole asset class. According to the approach used by Rouvinez (2003) it is supposed to 
be an estimation for the true return realised in the private equity industry, as he assumes 
the relation RT–t =( WT/Wt)
1/(T–t)−1 to hold. For the same reason, therefore, the second 
equation yields the true return variance. 
This approach has several drawbacks. First, we will get only an estimation for an 
average rate of return over a longer period of time. Hence, no dependency with market 
movements can be detected here. Second, this approach is not unbiased as the return 
measured over the private equity exposure time depends on how the true return 
generating process relates to risk free interest rates. One can see this problem very 
quickly by looking at the example presented above. Assume, for instance, that the risk 
free rate is 10%. In this case, applying the calculation proposed by Rouvinez would 
generate an average rate of return of 12.8%, which is higher than the true average rate of 
return. On the other side, using a risk free rate of 0% would lead to an average rate of 
return of 10.1%, which is again a biased result. Third, this approach does not allow for 
estimating correlations within the asset class. 
Some of this criticism can be circumvented by using an approach introduced by Chen et 
al. (2002), although this approach has some caveats as well. They start from the 
presumption that for every single fund the relation WT/W0 = (1+IRR)
1/T holds, where for 
simplicity we assume t = 0. Now, this return is put into relation with the returns on the 
public equity market over the same period. Therefore, the following modified market 
model holding for every single fund i is specified: 
 
( ) . 1 ln ) 1 ln( 0 i
M
T i i i R IRR T ε β + + = + −  
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Here, RTi–0
M  denotes the public market return, as measured by a representative index 
over fund’s i lifetime, and β is the elasticity of fund returns to the market return 
common to all private equity funds. Moreover, it is assumed that ε ∼ N(αT, σ
2T) and 
Cov[εi,εj]=ρτij σ
2 holds; here α is a fund specific return component per unit of time 
common to all private equity funds, ρ is the per unit of time correlation of the non 
market driven part of all distinct pairs of funds’ returns, and τij is the coexistence time 
of two funds i and j. Now, Chen et al. (2002) show that under these assumptions a 
maximum-likelihood estimation for the asset class specific parameters α, β, ρ and σ can 
be derived. 
As mentioned, this approach has some drawbacks as well. The major one is the fact that 
assuming all cash flows paid out by a private equity fund to be reinvested at the IRR up 
to terminal date T is not correct. From the numerical example above one can easily see 
that this would overestimate the true return of the fund. Of course, in general it is not 
clear whether this approach yields an over- or an underestimation of true funds’ returns. 
In any case, however, the estimation would be biased. 
In order to circumvent these problems, we outline an idea for a third approach, not yet 
discussed in the literature. Assume that from an ex-ante perspective the true return 
process Rt can be explained by the CAPM. In that case the conditional expectation of Rt 
can be written as 
 




t t R r R R E β β + − =  
 
where rt is the risk free interest rate governing in period t. Now, for every liquidated 
fund the following equation –using the conditional expectation of Rt– must hold: 
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It is a question to be left open here, whether this ex-ante equation can be transformed in 
an ex-post equation in a way that it will be possible to make an efficient and unbiased 
estimation for the parameter β governing the return process of the whole asset class. 
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Obviously, an estimation of cross correlation of private equity investment returns cannot 
be derived in the context of this approach, as we assume them to be from one single 
distribution. The most important advantage of this approach is the fact that we do not 
need any kind of reinvestment hypothesis with respect to a fund’s cash flows. 
Therefore, no potential bias is induced due to the lack of any kind of reinvestment 
assumption. 
3.  Risk Management and Asset Allocation 
In the preceding section we showed how an assessment of distributional characteristics 
of true returns Rt could be derived from observed proxy returns Qt, or observed IRRs. 
Such inference included the first and second moment of the return distribution F, i.e. the 
expected return on a private equity investment E(Rt) as well as the return variance 
Var(Rt). Moreover, under certain circumstances we were able to make an inference with 
respect to the correlation of private equity returns with other asset classes Cov(Rt
M; Rt
’) 
as well as with other investments in the same asset class Corr(Rt
n, Rt
l). 
Once distributional information is gathered from observed returns, most of the 
commonly used risk management as well as asset allocation techniques can be applied 
to portfolios containing private equity investments. This, for instance, is especially true 
with respect to the Value-at-Risk (VaR) approach, where the task is to infer some p-
quantile, qp = F
–1(p), of the distribution F of the returns. We point out, however, that the 
particular features of private equity cast some doubt on solely applying traditional risk 
management as well as asset allocation techniques. Empirical results on private equity 
and alternative investment such as venture capital indicate large standard deviations of 
period returns as well as significant skewness and excess kurtosis in the return 
distribution. This would have a particular impact on risk management, which we will 
discuss in the following section.  
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3.1 Specific Issues in Risk Management 
First, it should be noted that the asset value based estimation approaches presented in 
Section 2.1 rely on the assumption that smoothing is kind of a stationary process. 
Especially, we ruled out that this process is driven by changing strategic goals of 
reporting by general partners. In practice, however, one cannot rule out that the degree 
of smoothing is related to incentives governing the behaviour of general partners and, 
hence, will change over time depending on conditions not reflected in the model. For 
instance, one might presume that adjustment to market prices, given that they are 
privately known by general partners, is faster when they are increasing, especially when 
the whole market is in a positive mood, and slower when they are decreasing. 
Therefore, the presumption that the estimated distribution F already integrates 
illiquidity effects in a sufficient manner should not be taken as granted.9 The important 
consequence for risk management is that F is not a stationary distribution. 
Unfortunately, no reliable empirical information is available in this regard as the 
techniques for integrating this kind of problem in the estimation of F have still to be 
developed. 
Second, as long as we try to infer the true return distribution by looking at a fund’s cash 
flow it is rather unclear as to what extent a liquidity discount is then taken into account. 
One may presume that an investor forced to sell a stake in a private equity fund 
prematurely faces an IRR which is considerably lower than the IRR generated without 
premature liquidation. This is an important point, because the expected returns derived 
under this methodology integrate an illiquidity driven risk premium. This is an 
important aspect that has to be taken into account, especially for such groups of 
institutional investors that may face severe liquidity shocks. 
Third, it is well known from the risk management literature that asset return’s 
distributions are not fully captured by the assumption of normality and independence. 
Special emphasis has been put in this context on the empirical regularity of fat tails, i.e. 
the phenomenon that extreme realisations happen more frequently than predicted under 
a normal distribution. As risk management is focused on extreme realisations, this is 
one of the most important theoretical and practical challenges. In fact, Ljungqvist and 
                                                 
9 Of course, also the traditional risk management literature dedicated some attention to illiquidity issues; 
cf. for example Jorion (2001, Chapter 14). However, as these authors looked at traded assets, liquidity 
costs could be measured by bid-/ask-spreads, for instance. This would not be possible in the context of 
private equity.  
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Richardson (2003) and Kaplan and Schoar (2003) report that cash flow based private 
equity fund’s returns are heavily skewed in the sense that there is a significant downside 
in the form of funds performing poorly on a relative basis. However, Cochrane (2001) 
found a much less pronounced skewness, if one switches from arithmetic to geometric 
returns of single venture capital transactions. From a theoretical perspective one might 
expect returns to be skewed because of the option-like payoff structure of risky claims.10 
This skewness should be more pronounced the higher the debt is relative to a firm’s 
market value and the more the total firm value can be modelled as an option-like payoff 
itself. The last point, at least, gives a strong indication that return skewness of young 
and innovative business ventures should be more pronounced, as their investment 
projects often can be characterized as a real option. Therefore, the implementation of 
extreme value theory in risk management tools may be especially important for 
investors exposed to private equity risks. The bad news are, however, that for the time 
being we do not have an empirically well founded understanding of extreme value 
behaviour in private equity investments. 
Fourth, non-normality features of private equity portfolio returns may also relate to 
what a particular institutional investor defines as a proper investing strategy. The choice 
of such a strategy will depend on the institutional investor’s financial goals as well as on 
his particular knowledge advantages. Two common generic strategies are diversification 
and specialisation. While diversification lowers risk as long as asset returns are not 
perfectly correlated and increases the degree of normality from a financial risk 
management point of view, specialisation does not. When following a diversification 
strategy investors seek constrained risk reduction for their overall asset portfolio. This 
strategy includes diversification not only between companies and industries but also 
between financing stages especially when venture capital investments are considered. 
When following a specialisation strategy with private equity investments, investors 
increase overall risk relative to diversification. The payoff from exposing a portfolio to 
diversifiable risk is that it may offer rents from controlling activities. This is especially 
important for institutional investors acting as general partners, as there is an obvious 
principal-agent relationship between the venture capital investor and its investee.11 
                                                 
10  It should be noted that financial theory models equity as a contingent claim –a call option– on firm 
assets. It predicts stronger nonlinearity of payoffs for out of the money call options. For related 
empirical findings based on traded IPO aftermarket equity issues in the German Neuer Markt see for 
example Wagner (2001). 
11  Cf. in this regard Reid et al. (1997).  
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Moreover, high degrees of specialisation can be helpful in building up reputation and 
further in gaining access to networks, to information flows as well as to deal flow from 
other private equity investors. In a survey study of venture capital investors, Norton and 
Tenenbaum (1993) give evidence that some considerable number of investors in their 
sample follow such specialisation strategies. Of course, an empirical well-founded 
understanding of the specific characteristics of private equity returns, especially as far 
as extreme value realisations are concerned, is even more important for institutional 
investors following such a specialisation strategy. 
3.2 Specific Issues in Asset Allocation 
Taking the aforementioned methodological problems in estimating the parameters of the 
distribution  F into account, one may not be surprised by the quite different results 
obtained in the literature. As far as asset value based approaches are concerned, for the 
time being, there are two studies to be mentioned here. Emery (2003), whose results 
should be interpreted cautiously as he did not explicitly correct for the smoothing 
problem, reports that returns calculated on the basis of biannual NAV US-funds data 
average to 15% for LBO-funds and 25% for venture capital funds per year.12 The 
correlation with S&P500 returns is 56% resp. 64%. The correlation between LBO- and 
venture capital funds’ returns is almost zero. Kaplan and Schoar (2003) use a large data 
set provided by Venture Economics. They try to overcome the smoothing problem by 
looking only at funds which have already been closed or have been alive for at least five 
years. In fact, they can show that the correlation between the rates of return calculated 
for this subsample of funds is highly correlated to the IRR of the same subsample. Due 
to this restriction, however, the approach of Kaplan and Schoar (2003) is, in fact, not 
that different from a cash flow based approach. For a sample of more than 1’000 funds 
they find an average IRR of 17%, while the median is 12%. The standard deviation of 
the IRR is 32%. Moreover, they find evidence in favour of performance persistence. 
As far as other cash flow based approaches are concerned, Ljungqvist and Richardson 
(2003), for instance, find a median IRR of almost 20% for a US dominated sample of 73 
funds with a cash flow history of at least nine years; the standard deviation of the IRR is 
                                                 
12  The reason why Emery (2003) calculates the returns on a biannual basis relates to the smoothing 
problem. In fact, he starts from the plausible presumption that smoothing effects vanish in the long run. 
However, whether a two year return period is already sufficient in order to overcome the smoothing 
bias is a question with not clear cut answer.  
 
- 18 -  Managing Investment Risks of Institutional 
Private Equity Investors 
 
22%. Cochrane (2001) uses data from more than 16’000 single venture capital 
transactions and calculates an arithmetic return of 59% with a standard deviation of 
100%. More interesting data, at least from an asset allocation perspective, has been 
reported by Chen et al. (2002). By using IRR data of about 150 liquidated venture 
capital funds and by applying the maximum likelihood estimation technique explained 
in Section 2.2, they calculate an average venture capital fund return of 45%, with a 
standard deviation of 116% and a correlation with large capitalization stock’s returns of 
4%. Finally, Rouvinez (2003) by applying a cash flow based method already explained 
in Section 2.2 finds an expected return on a private equity investment of 14% and a 
standard deviation of 34%. His methodology does not allow for calculating correlation 
coefficients with public market returns. Of course, these results may still be interpreted 
cautiously as they have been derived despite of severe data restriction problems. It will 
therefore still take a couple of years until reliable empirical results will be available. 
Nevertheless, it may become something like a stylized fact that venture capital returns 
are perceivably higher than returns on non-venture capital private equity investments. 
This seems to come along with a very much higher volatility as well as with a lower 
correlation to public equity returns. Given that future empirical research will 

















  0,0%  8,0%  15% 
100% 5%  3,0%  8,7%  15% 
100% 10%  1,5%  8,3%  15% 
50% 5%  14,2%  11,1%  15% 
50% 10% 11,7%  10,6%  15% 
50% 20% 6,2%  9,4%  15% 
30% 30% 21,0%  12,6%  15% 
Tab. 3.2. Optimal portfolio weights of a private equity asset in a private and public equity 
portfolio for different distributional parameters. 
Finally, we would like to emphasize that the lack of clear cut empirical results with 
respect to the conditional and unconditional distribution of private equity investment 
returns is a serious problem making any asset allocation decision a rather tricky task. In 
fact, even a slight shift in the distributional parameters may have a very large impact on 
portfolio allocation. Hence, even a slightly biased assessment of these parameters could  
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lead to dramatic errors in asset allocation. This becomes clear from the next table, where 
we show how the optimal weight of a private equity investment α in an equity portfolio 
changes according to a change in the return variance as well as in the return correlation 
with public equity. In order to calculate these weights we assumed that the expected 
return on a public investment is 8% with a standard deviation of 15%. Moreover, we 
assumed the expected return on a private equity investment to be 30%. The weights for 
the private equity asset were derived by maximizing the expected portfolio return under 
the constraint that portfolio variance is equal to the variance of a 100% public equity 
portfolio. Other asset classes, like bonds or real estate, are not taken into account here. 
4. Conclusion 
Private equity has become an increasingly important alternative asset class for 
institutional investors as it may offer return as well as diversification benefits relative to 
traditional stock and bond market investments. Despite the downturn of the industry 
over the years 2001 to 2003, it is commonly believed that private equity will become an 
even more important source of corporate financing over the years to come. For this 
reason, understanding and managing risks associated with this asset class is of crucial 
importance for institutional investors. 
This article aims at improving this understanding and, hence, to give a foundation for 
solving specific problems arising in the context of private equity risk management and 
asset allocation decisions. As a starting point, we emphasized that –in our view– the 
most specific characteristic of private equity is the lack of an organised secondary 
market. Hence, investing comes along with low liquidity or even illiquidity, i.e. with the 
impossibility to transact at a targeted point in time and/or with the occurrence of 
substantial transaction costs. 
There are two major consequences of the lack of an organised secondary market that 
have been treated extensively in this paper. Firstly, illiquidity implies that it is not 
possible to observe a continuous series of true investment returns over time. In other 
words, illiquidity goes along with serious performance measurement problems. Section 
2 was entirely devoted to this problem in that we tried to show to what extent this sort 
of measurement problem can be resolved. Basically, there are two ways for doing this. 
Either one tries to infer market values from reported asset values, or one tries to infer 
true investment returns from realized cash flow based investment returns. As we  
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showed, both approaches are not free of serious restrictions. As a consequence, our 
empirical understanding of the risk-/return characteristics of this asset class is still 
incomplete and should be subjected to further research. Secondly, given that we would 
be able to overcome these measurement problems we could apply several well-known 
risk management as well as asset allocation methods to the private equity asset class as 
well. However, in our view there are some specific issues in this context that apply 
solely to portfolios exposed to private equity risk. We discussed these issues in Section 
3. 
As far as risk management is concerned, specific issues relate to the following 
problems. Reliability of return distribution measurement is a rather serious problem, as 
one cannot rule out general partners to follow a strategic disclosure policy, which would 
be very difficult to integrate in a statistical model of a return generating process. It is 
also unclear whether a cash flow based return inference model would really capture the 
whole return impact of illiquidity. Moreover, there are good theoretical reasons 
suggesting that private equity returns, especially when they are related to venture capital 
investments, will be governed by a distribution with much more pronounced fat tails 
than public equity returns. Finally, these issues may be faced in a different way 
depending on whether the investor follows a diversification or specialization strategy. 
There are some preliminary empirical results indicating that specialization plays a much 
more important role in the private equity industry than in the public equity industry. All 
these issues enrich risk management of portfolios exposed to private equity risk with 
rather specific problems. 
Beyond these risk management issues, we also discussed issues related to asset 
allocation decisions. Our major point here was to show that the empirical understanding 
of the risk-/return characteristics of the private equity class is, in fact, incomplete and, to 
a certain extent, contradictory. This is important as purposeful asset allocation decisions 
can only be based on a well-founded empirical understanding of risk-/return 
characteristics. Moreover, we showed that even slight biases in the estimated 
distributional parameters can have a large impact on asset allocation decisions. This is 
one of the major reasons why we strongly emphasize the need for much more additional 
empirical and theoretical work on this asset class.  
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